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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Carl Jones was tried and convicted of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  Jones appeals two of the District Court‟s rulings, arguing that it abused 
its discretion in: (1) denying the Batson challenge he raised during voir dire of the jury; 
and (2) repeating the law on the defense of necessity when instructing the jury.
1
  We will 
affirm. 
                                              
1
 Solely to preserve the issues for Supreme Court review, Jones raises two other 
matters on which we have previously ruled:  (1) the District Court erred in not instructing 
the jury that it had the power to be the arbiter of the law as well as the facts; and (2) 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it does not regulate an activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Jones recognizes that we have ruled that “jury 
nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its 
constitutional role.”  United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 329 (3d cir. 2006).  Far from 
erring in failing to instruct a jury in jury nullification, the District Court has the authority 
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I.  Background 
 
 Jones was arrested following an altercation at a fraternity party on the campus of 
Temple University on September 18, 2005.  He was indicted, tried, and convicted under 
28 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1), the “felon in possession” statute.  During voir dire, Jones raised a 
Batson challenge after the prosecution struck two African-American jurors and seated 
three out of a possible five African-American jurors in the venire pool.  The prosecutor 
used her other four peremptory challenges to strike four white jurors.  Without finding 
that Jones had established a prima facie case under the framework established under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the District Court asked the prosecutor “for the 
sake of argument” to state her reasons for striking the two black jurors.  With respect to  
Juror No. 22, the prosecutor stated that she exercised the strike because (i) the juror had 
been laid off by the city and might unfairly judge city employees, and (ii) the juror had 
her eyes closed at times during voir dire and may not have been paying attention.  With 
respect to Juror No. 30, the prosecutor stated that the juror‟s eyes looked bloodshot, and 
that he appeared to be looking down, nodding off, and not engaged at times.   
 When Jones‟ counsel disputed that either juror had failed to pay attention, or that 
Juror No. 30‟s eyes appeared bloodshot, the District Court responded: 
If I thought that there was a juror on this panel who wasn‟t 
paying attention, I guarantee you, I would have done so, and 
command [sic] that juror‟s attention.   
                                                                                                                                                  
to remove a juror engaging in jury nullification.  See United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 
257, 303 (3d Cir. 2007).  Jones also recognizes that we rejected his argument on the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 
2001).   
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 This is her perception. . . .  I am telling you that 
factually, based upon the record in front of this man right 
now, this Judge, I don‟t agree with her assessments, but since 
we‟re speaking for the record as well, the record should note 
that I am an African-American Judge. . . .  The record should 
note that I have been in the courtroom since the mid „70s, and 
I am highly sensitive to motivations of people , and highly 
sensitive to their behaviors in my courtroom, because I expect 
justice. . . . I am finding as a fact right now, and for the rest of 
all time, that her motivation is not racially-motivated.  The 
basis is that she -- she exercised the strikes unwisely, period.  
 
App. at 350-51.  
 
 Following trial, on November 21, 2008, the judge instructed the jury, inter alia, on 
the defense of justification.  In addition to discussing the elements of the defense detailed 
in the model instructions which this Court has approved, the District Court instructed the 
jury that the defendant could possess the firearm no longer than absolutely necessary, that 
Congress wrote § 922 in absolute terms banning all felons from possessing firearms, and 
that the factual circumstances under which a convicted felon can possess a firearm are 
quite limited.  After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury sent out a note 
asking “when is it acceptable for a convicted felon to be in possession of a firearm?  For 
example, didn‟t keep the gun longer than necessary.”  App. at 670.  In response to the 
jury‟s question, the judge repeated the elements of a justification defense paraphrased 
from the model instructions.  He then went on to explain the narrowness of its 
application, and the requirement that the felon should surrender the firearm as soon as he 
safely can and not possess the firearm any longer than absolutely necessary.  Both before 
and after the instructions were given, Jones‟ counsel objected to the inclusion of the “no 
longer than absolutely necessary” language and to references to the intent of Congress.  
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He argued that the Court should limit the instructions to the model language.  The District 
Court responded that he habitually paraphrases jury instructions so that the jury can 
understand them more easily, and that he is obligated to clarify points when the jury asks 
a question to ensure that the jurors understand.  
 The jury deliberated for approximately two more hours and returned a guilty 
verdict.  The District Court sentenced Jones to a term of imprisonment of 300 months, 
and Jones filed this timely appeal.
2
  
II. 
 
 The Supreme Court outlined the framework for a trial court to use in adjudicating 
a Batson claim as follows:   
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a 
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race 
[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution 
must offer a race- neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question [; and t]hird, in light of the parties‟ submissions, the 
trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown 
purposeful discrimination. 
 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008) (internal citation omitted).   
 The question of whether a prima facie case has been established “becomes moot, 
and thus need not even be addressed, when the prosecutor provides explanations for the 
strikes.”  Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 723 (3d Cir. 2004).  Thus, the issue of a prima 
facie case is moot here.  
                                              
2
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over this action  under 29 
U.S.C. § 921(g)(1).  We have appellate jurisdiction over the District Court‟s final order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 A prosecutor meets her burden of production by offering non-race-based reasons 
for her strikes that do not violate equal protection.  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 
(1995).  Once the prosecutor states race neutral reasons for her strikes, the inquiry then 
proceeds to step three, where the trial court determines whether the defendant has carried 
his burden of showing that the prosecutor was motivated by discriminatory intent.  Id.; 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.  A court must consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon 
the issue of racial animosity,” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, and should look to the “totality of 
the relevant facts” when determining whether impermissible racial discrimination 
motivated the prosecutor‟s strikes.   Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991).  
“[A] trial court‟s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is 
clearly erroneous.”  Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477.  The demeanor of the attorney exercising 
the challenge will often be the best evidence of discriminatory intent, and, because 
“determinations of credibility and demeanor lie „peculiarly within a trial judge‟s 
province,‟” an appellate court, absent exceptional circumstances, should defer to a trial 
court‟s judgment about the credibility of the attorney who exercises a peremptory 
challenge.  Id. 
 Jones‟ brief summarizes his challenge to the District Court‟s exercise of its Batson 
responsibilities as follows: 
[W]here the district court rejects the prosecutor‟s proffered 
reasons as false, it may not speculate as to legitimate, 
unstated, race-neutral reasons for the prosecutor‟s use of her 
peremptory strikes and deny the Batson challenge on the basis 
of those presumed reasons. 
 
* * * 
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The district court [has] found that [the] proffered reasons 
were false.  But then, instead of weighing the evidentiary 
value of the government‟s statement of obviously pretextual 
reasons for the strikes, the district court considered as 
evidence that the strikes were not racially motivated its own 
speculation that the prosecutor had unspoken, race-neutral 
reasons for making the challenged strikes.  Because this Court 
has repeatedly held that such speculation is improper, the 
district court failed to conduct the proper inquiry into whether 
the government‟s use of peremptory strikes was racially 
motivated and done in violation of Mr. Jones‟s Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
 
Appellant‟s Br. at 22, 29. 
 
 We find that Jones is wrong on his facts.  As we read the record, the District Court 
did not find the prosecutor‟s proffered explanations to be “false” or “pretextual” and did 
not “speculate” about other possible race neutral explanations.  Rather, the District Court 
found as a fact that the prosecutor‟s challenges resulted from what the Court believed to 
be misperceptions of the prosecutor with respect to the demeanor and conduct of the two 
jurors.  While those challenges were “unwise” in the sense that they could have been 
better used, the Court concluded that what was in the mind of the prosecutor were 
misperceptions and that those misperceptions had nothing to do with racial animus.  
Accordingly, there was no need to speculate about other possible race neutral motives. 
 In short, the District Court evaluated the proffered explanation of the challenges 
and while it disagreed with the prosecutor‟s evaluation of the situation, it declined to 
draw the inference that they were pretexts for racial animus.  To the extent Jones 
contends that the District Court was not entitled to decline to draw that inference, he is 
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wrong.  See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (disbelief in 
proffered reasons does not compel finding of intentional discrimination). 
 Nor can we fault the District Court for going on to affirmatively and expressly find 
that the prosecutor‟s challenges were not motivated by racial animus.  As we have noted, 
Jones had the burden of  proving racial animus, and the record contained no substantial 
evidence of the same once it was determined that the prosecutor‟s explanations were not 
pretextual.
3
 
 Here, the District Court determined, from its “peculiar” vantage point of firsthand 
observation, that it disagreed with the prosecutor‟s perceptions and that the prosecutor 
had exercised her strikes unwisely, but that the strikes were not racially motivated.  This 
Court should only overturn a trial court‟s determination of no purposeful discrimination if 
it is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha[d] been committed.”  
Hernandez,  500 U.S. at 369 (internal citation omitted).  Having reviewed the record, we 
are not left with such a conviction.
4
 
                                              
3
 There is, for example, no evidence of strikes of minority jurors for reasons that 
apply equally to seated or accepted white jurors, statistical patterns of strikes against one 
racial group, patterns of variances in voir dire questions and jury shuffling directed at 
racial groups in the same venire pool, or historic patterns of a prosecutor‟s office use of 
racial strikes to keep minorities from the jury panel. 
4
 Contrary to Jones‟ suggestion, Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 
2010), is readily distinguishable from the case before us.  We there found reversible error  
because the District Court had effectively omitted the third step of the Batson inquiry by 
(1) unreasonably limiting the defendant‟s opportunity to prove pretext, (2) failing to 
address whether the prosecutor‟s explanation was pretextual, and (3) not making an 
express finding on the ultimate issue of whether racial animus played a role in the strikes.  
To the extent Jones urged at oral argument that Coombs required more engagement by 
the District Court with the evidence, we stress that this record contains no evidence 
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III. 
 
 Jones argues that the District Court should have limited its instruction on the 
defense of justification to the language in the model instructions and should not have 
included additional language that a convicted felon cannot possess a firearm any longer 
than “absolutely necessary.”  Jones maintains that the Court‟s instruction that a convicted 
felon could possess a firearm no longer than absolutely necessary was itself 
“unnecessary,” and that the District Court compounded this alleged error through “undue 
repetition of the unnecessary instruction.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 44.  He contends that this 
“undue repetition” coupled with the Court‟s discussion of the legislative intent behind § 
922(g) served “to lead the jury to the impression that the defense of justification is 
unlikely to apply except in the rarest of circumstances - and, by extension, not in the case 
at bar.”  Id. at 51. 
 Where the District Court accurately states the law, we review for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We 
exercise plenary review to determine whether jury instructions misstated the applicable 
law, but in the absence of a misstatement we review for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation 
omitted).  Here, the District Court accurately explained the law when charging the jury 
and correctly emphasized the narrowness of the necessity defense.  It did not repeat the 
jury instruction an inordinate number of times.  It spent a comparable amount of time 
explaining the government‟s burden to prove knowing possession of a firearm beyond a 
                                                                                                                                                  
arguably supporting a finding of racial animus other than the allegedly pretextual 
explanations which the Court addressed. 
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reasonable doubt, and in explaining the preponderance standard for the defendant‟s 
burden of proof. 
 The Court then had to repeat the justification instruction when the jury, after 
deliberating for two hours, asked for clarification of the justification defense and 
specifically about the length of time a convicted felon could possess a firearm.  At that 
point, the District Court repeated the instruction and paraphrased the law behind the 
instruction, as he had done when he first instructed the jury.  We cannot say that the 
District Court abused its discretion when it correctly characterized the law and did not 
repeat the instruction needlessly. 
IV. 
 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
